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CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS RESOURCES 
FOR THE CREATION OF WORLD PEACE1 
by Leslie A. Muray 
Dr. Leslie Muray (Episcopalean) is teaching religious studies at Lansing Community 
College, Central Michigan University, and Western Michigan University. He received 
the Rei. M. degree from Claremont School of Theology and the Ph.D. degree from 
Claremont Graduate School. Dr. Muray, a native of Hungary, is the author of 
numerous articles on Hungary, some of which appeared in this publication. 
The nations of Central and Eastern Europe have alternately been pawns in geopolitical 
struggles, objects of fascination, seen as prototypes of the kind of backwardness that needs 
to be overcome in the modern world, and subject to a lack of understanding. Central and 
Eastern Europe, strategically located in providing Western Europe's gateway to the Middle 
East and the Orient (and vice versa), has served as the catalyst for the outbreak of two World 
Wars. The region, with its distinctive conglomeration of peoples and their unique 
interrelated histories, remains significant not only strategically but in its own right. Some 
of its ethnic groups have resumed deep seated deadly rivalries. 
If there is anything threatening the peace of Central and Eastern Europe, it is an 
interminable list of ethnic and nationalist antagonisms and conflicting territorial claims, 
which find a breeding ground at times of massive economic dislocation. The region's greatest 
potential contribution to the creation of world peace is the non-violent resolution of these 
ethnic antagonisms, competing national sentiments, and conflicting territorial claims. By 
doing so, it can also serve as a role model for other regions, nations, and communities that, 
in their unique historical and cultural particularities, may be experiencing similar tensions 
and conflict. While I shall make allusions to the related issues of democracy and economic 
justice, this essay deals primarily with the possible resolution of ethnic and national conflict 
in Central and Eastern Europe. 
The nations of Central and Eastern Europe have their own distinctive cultural and 
religious resources for the creation of world peace and especially for the potential resolution 
of the ethnic conflict that threatens to obstruct this endeavor. To represent these resources, 
I have chosen the lives and thought of two very significant historical figures from Hungary, 
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my native land and the country in the region with which I am most familiar. Endre Ady 
(1877-1919), second only to Sandor Petofi as Hungary's greatest poet, was at the forefront 
of an intellectual renaissance at the beginning of the twentieth century, who, as an Hungarian 
patriot, identified with the nationalistic aspirations of all of Hungary's disparate ethnic 
groups at a time of intense Magyarization (Magyar is the Hungarian word for Hungarian). 
In case the relevance of my use of someone who died nearly three decades before the advent 
of the Communist period seem questionable, I need to point out that Ady's influence and 
impact have never waned. During the interwar period, when the kind of liberalism he had 
espoused was in disrepute and in the early days of which the Horthy regime had tried in 
absentia and confiscated the properties of Mihaly Karolyi, President of the short lived 
Republic at the end of World War I, whom the poet had supported passionately, his poetry 
remained very popular. Under Communist rule, there were concerted efforts to coopt his 
legacy (along with genuine appreciation), 2 attempting to depict him as a Communist heart 
even if his ideology was understandably underdeveloped. Today, Ady's legacy has 
widespread appeal across Hungary's political and cultural spectrum: his nationalism to the 
nationalist, his liberalism to the liberals, his social conscience to those concerned with the 
dislocating effects of economic privatization. His appeal is to all who anguish about what 
it means to be a Magyar in the postcommunist age. Perhaps best symbolizing Ady's 
continuing significance are the letters on the license plate of the car of the Prime Minister 
(who, along with many others of diverse political and intellectual orientations, frequently cite 
the poet): ADY. 
The other historical figure I have chosen is Istvan Bibo ( 1911-1979), the most influential 
political thinker in the last two-thirds of the twentieth century, if not the entire century. 
He made simple but insightful proposals, resting on a profound analysis of human existence, 
toward the resolution of ethnic conflict. 
I have also chosen these two particular figures because, in their distinctive ways, they 
represent the indissolubility of religion and culture in the nations of Central and Eastern 
Europe. It is virtually impossible to distinguish what is religious and what is secular in the 
cultures of the region, the impact of religious symbols discernible in the most secular, even 
anti-religious, of intellectuals. Although ostensibly secular intellectuals, the lives and works 
of Ady and Bibo are unintelligible apart from a consideration of their religious sensibilities. 
In using these thinkers in this essay, I am engaging in a "hermeneutics of retrieval" that 
seeks to reappropriate a "usable past." Just as Christian feminists and other theologians of 
liberation, while fully acknowledging that historically Christianity has all too often 
functioned as an instrument of oppression, claim that there are suppressed or neglected 
aspects of the Christian tradition that are liberating and have served to energize struggles for 
liberation, the "usable past" they attempt to recover, so I maintain that there are important, 
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often neglected resources, typified by Ady and Bibo, in Central and Eastern European 
history, a "usable past," for the creation of peace in the region and in the world.3 
The reappropriation of this "usable past" helps provide some of the values and vision, the 
ethos, requisite for the potential resolution of conflict between ethnic and national 
communities and consequently for the creation of world peace. While these values have 
never been ahistorical or disconnected from lived experience, the search for the structures 
that embody such values needs to be continuous. 
Before proceeding to the body of this paper, I need to define what I mean by peace. 
Peace, the shalom of the Hebrew Bible and the eirene of the Greek of Christian Scripture, 
is a comprehensive eschatological symbol rooted in the notion of wholeness and encompassing 
personal peace, social peace, and natural peace in their fundamental interrelatedness.• This 
comprehensive eschatological symbol includes health and material well being. 5 It is universal,. 
rooted in God's love unbounded love for all, moving us beyond particular nationalisms and 
ethnic preoccupations yet expressing and realizing itself in the affirmation of particularity.6 
Implicit in the realization of peace, in the fragmentariness of human existence, is respect for 
and among individuals, for ethnic and national communities, for minorities, safeguarded by 
institutionalized procedures, economic justice, and the maximization of the participation of 
individuals and communities in the decisions that affect their futures and in the fabric of the 
larger communities of which they are part. 
I. 
Following the suppression of the Revolution of 1848-49, the ensuing reign of terror and 
the passive resistance of the Magyars, Ferenc Deak, "A Haza Bolcse" [the country or. 
homeland's wise one], designed the Compromise of 1867, creating a dualist or dual state. The 
Habsburg Empire became the Austro-Hungarian Empire, with common foreign, defense and 
finance ministries but separate autonomous governments and parliaments. While the 
franchise was restricted and trade unions and socialist parties outlawed for a time, a form of 
parliamentary democracy, with parties, including the Party of Independence which won the 
election of 1905 much to Emperor Franz Joseph's acquiescent chagrin, representing a variety 
of points beyond the imaginations of North Americans, was in place. In Bismarkian fashion, 
forms of national health care, unemployment insurance, and social security were enacted. 
It is important to remember that the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were 
periods of intense nationalism for all of the various ethnic groups that constituted the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire. During this time, compounding tensions between ethnic groups, 
the Hungarian government instituted a program of enforced Magyarization of other ethnic. 
groups within what Hungarian nationalists call greater or great Hungary, the size of the 
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nation prior to the loss of two-thirds of its territory resulting from the Treaty of Trianon in 
1920. Further aggravating enmity between ethnic groups was the old feudal structure that 
remained largely intact and the declining economic conditions of the peasants, the lower 
nobility, and the relatively small but growing urban working class. 
In this historical context, Hungary underwent a cultural renaissance in the late nineteenth 
and eady twentieth centuries. The outstanding figure and symbol of this cultural renaissance 
was Endre Ady (1877-1919). His Western orientation and sojourns in Paris paradoxically led 
him to retrieve long lost primordial Hungarian songs, particularly those of the fugitive Kuruc 
revolutionaries (the term Kuruc originated from the time of .the Peasant Rebellion led by 
Gyorgy Dozsa in 1514), who had rebelled against the Habsburg domination (1703-1711) 
under the leadership of Ferenc Rakoczi. Ady's unique fusion of modern Western and 
primordial Magyar elements had an electrifying effect, particularly on the younger 
generation. 7 His poetry, uncanny in its ability to express the joys, sorrows, and aspirations 
of the poor and the oppressed was instrumental in the revitalization of the Hungarian 
language. 
No less than in his poetry, Ady fused elements of Western modernism, uniquely 
Hungarian concerns, and Magyar nationalism in a distinctive fashion in his politics. Always 
an uncompromising liberal, he became increasingly radicalized in the early years of the 
twentieth century. He felt that the liberal establishment that dominated the country's politics 
had betrayed its own heritage. He supported universal suffrage, the break up of feudal 
estates, land reform and redistribution for the peasants. Ever the Francophile, the Western 
politician he admired the most was the socialist Jean Jaures. While he never became a 
socialist and rejected the determinism of dialectical materialism, as well as the positivism of 
many of his fellow radicals, he had deep sympathies for the welfare measures advocated by 
the Social Democrats. He was a regular contributor to the Social Democratic daily Nepszava 
[People's Word or Voice], and concluded that a viable democracy could be established in 
Hungary only through the active cooperation of the progressive elements of the middle 
classes, workers, and peasants, and only if the aspiration of each of these classes were 
realized.8 
Most striking is his treatment of what in his day was referred to as the "problem of the 
nationalities." An Hungarian nationalist who had done much to retrieve aspects of the 
national heritage, Ady came to identify with Hungary's other ethnic groups' struggle for their 
rights and autonomy; he saw in their particular struggles what the Magyars were seeking to 
realize in theirs. As a result, he advocated full rights for non-Magyar nationalities and 
minorities, autonomy and self -determination in regions where they were the predominant 
part of the population. He proposed the abolition of the Monarchy, the break up of the Dual 
system, and full sovereignty and independence for Hungary. He supported the proposal of 
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his friend Oscar Jaszi (1875-1957), the founder of Hungarian sociology and leader of the 
Radical Party (libertarian moderate socialist), for an "eastern Switzerland," a confederation 
of autonomous nations and ethnic groups in a free trade zone, democratic and socialist in 
structure, neutral in its relation to major powers, and pacifist concerning military affairs, 9 
resembling the idea of a Trans-Danubian Federation or Danubian Federation that has 
emerged periodically from the time of Kossuth's exile in the 1850s to the Prime Ministership 
of Imre Nagy in the 1950s. He encouraged Magyars and non-Magyars alike not to fight each 
other but to join together in overthrowing their common oppressors, the feudal nobility.10 
It has been said that the way to get to know the soul of a people is through their poetry. 
With the exception of the poetry of Petofi, there is no better way to understand the 
Hungarian soul than through the poetry of Ady. The support of the rights and aspirations 
of non-Magyar ethnic groups and nationalities on the part of someone of Ady's stature, 
combined with his own nationalism, at a time enforced Magyarization, which took no small 
amount of courage, is all the more remarkable. 
It is appropriate to ask what any of the foregoing discussion has to do with religion. To 
understand any aspect of Ady, we need to realize that all of his life he was haunted by his 
deep Calvinist roots. Although he was the first Hungarian poet of comparable prominence 
to proclaim publicly his lack of belief in God, his poems about God are the most haunting 
and powerful; he always struggled with God, often praying for divine forgiveness, most 
movingly asking to be loved.U Some of his "God poems" are bitingly sarcastic and bitter, 
others sentimental. He hoped for the coming of a "good, new Jesus," not the domesticated 
one created in the image of the hereditary aristocracy.12 During World War I, Ady wrote of 
God as a God of Peace.13 Other poems witness to a God of Mystery beyond the God of 
clerics and the nobility.1• 
"The God poems" reflect a profound probing of the Bible, particularly Hebrew Scripture. 
Some adopt biblical themes, images, and metaphors while others appropriate the motif of a 
God of justice condemning and transforming social injustice. 
Ady is a historical figure who embodies the indissolubility of religion and culture in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Although the prototype of the Hungarian secular intellectual,_ 
he was no less "God intoxicated" in his poetry than Spinoza was in his philosophy; his life and 
work are unintelligible apart from his passionate preoccupation with God. In the manner of 
Jacob's wrestling with the angel, Ady wrestled frequently with God. It was in that very 
capacity of human beings to wrestle with God that he found one of the most profound 
sources of human dignity. In effect denying God in the name of God, Ady was the prophet 
of his age to his people, his passionate religious and political concerns inseparably 
intertwined, mutually, creatively shaping and cross fertilizing each other. 
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II. 
The second historical figure I shall treat in this essay is Istvan Bibo (1911-1979), 
Hungary's most influential political thinker in the second two-thirds of the twentieth 
century, if not the entire century. Early in his career, he worked at various Budapest court 
offices, later in the Ministry of Justice. He also lectured at various universities. In October, 
1944, shortly after the takeover of the Arrow Cross, the Hungarian fascist party, he was 
arrested, turned over to the German SS and detained for four days on account of his issuance 
of marriage licenses to Hungarian Jews, delaying their imminent deportation and enhancing 
their prospects for survival. Bibo spent the duration of the war in hiding. 
Following the war, he joined the coalition government (the Popular Front), working in 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs, supervising respectively the department of administration 
and legislative planning. He was an enthusiastic supporter of the coalition government's 
policy of land reform, nationalization of large scale industries, and dismantling of the old 
feudal structure. Bibo left the government in 1946 and as a consistent democratic socialist, 
was a persistent critic of the Communist Party's "salami tactics." After the Communist 
takeover in 1948 and the ensuing Stalinist reign of terror, he was silent politically and made 
his living as a librarian. 
During the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, Bibo joined the last cabinet of Prime Minister 
Imre Nagy. As Soviet troops moved into the Parliament building during the brutal 
suppression of the uprising, they found Bibo to be the only occupant of the building. He 
told them he was a minister of state and too busy to be disturbed. The illiterate troops from 
Central Asia saluted and stood guard as he wrote memos and messages to the West on behalf 
of the Revolutionary Government. Eventually arrested in May, 1957, he was condemned to 
life imprisonment but released during the general amnesty of 1963. He lived as a librarian 
prior to his retirement, writing sparingly compared to his output during the 1940s. Dying 
in 1979, he did not get to see the Festschrift written in his honor by seventy-six of Hungary's 
leading intellectuals and published "samizdat" form. 
As we consider the pertinence of Bibo's thought to our topic, the importance of religion, 
at times in subtle ways, is readily apparent in the anthropology that provides the 
underpinning for his political thought. Influenced by his Calvinist-roots, as well as 
existentialism, reinforced rather acutely by historical experiences under the reign of 
authoritarian and totalitarian regimes of the right and the left, his analysis of human 
existence led him to conclude that the consciousness of fear is the root of religion and 
politics.15 The root of fear is the consciousness of our mortality, which, metaphorically, Bibo 
equates with eating of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge, his version of the Fall of Original 
Sin. While all living things are afraid of danger, in humans, with the awareness of our own 
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mortality, this fear is accentuated to the point where we are even afraid of our own thoughts 
and project fear outside of ourselves. We realize rather quickly that the most intense sources 
of fear are other humans.16 
One of the ways humans deal with fear is to appear strong and powerful by coercing and 
dominating others. The reverse, being coerced into subservience to others, plays upon and 
is reinforced by that inherently human sense of fear. 17 However, both of these methods are 
destructive: "I can free myself from fear by neither being subject to the oppressive coercion 
of my fellow humans nor by holding any of them under my oppressive coercion."18 This can 
be attained only in a society free of domination, whose people are free from the need to 
dominate or be dominated, and characterized by reciprocity and mutuality ("reciprocal 
services" in Bibo's terminology).19 
To be liberated from fear, people need a certain inner strength. On the other hand, 
however, socio-politico-economic institutions and structures can empower or obstruct 
freedom from fear. 
This point, dealing with the relationship between the individual and the community, 
which he raised in a discussion of opposition to democracy in the name of Hungarian 
nationalism during the interwar period, is pivotal to all aspects of Bibo's political thought. 
We might describe his view of this relationship as relational, reciprocal, interactionist, as one 
of the individual-in community. In that vein, he claims that " ... the liberation of 
individuals also means the liberation, opening and external and internal enrichment of the 
entire community".20 In the case of the individual, individuals liberated from fear have a 
"democratic character": "being a democrat means, primarily, not to be afraid;"21 not to be 
afraid of "the other," those with different languages, of other races, different opinions; of 
revolutions, terror, humiliation. For what we fear in political life, we tend to bring about 
with our very fear. 22 The institutions and structures that empower freedom from fear and 
foster the development are political and democracy. 
For Bibo, the principle of self-determination extends democratic notions into the lives 
of nations and communities. The principle of self -determination rests on ideas that stress 
"the equality of human dignity and the freedom of every human being;"23 as the term 
implies, it involves national self -determination and popular sovereignty. 
His proposals for the resolution of ethnic and national conflict are relatively simple but 
profound and common sensical, based on the overarching principle of self -determination. 
Profoundly influenced by Hungary's loss of territory after World War I, the oppression of 
Magyar as well as other minorities in the newly created nations of Central and Eastern 
Europe and the occupation of Hungary successively by Germany and the Soviet Union, he 
advocates non-interference in the affairs of other nations,· particularly by superpowers, as 
an indispensable element in the implementation of the principle of self -determination. No 
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less indispensable is decentralization and autonomy in regions within nations where ethnic 
minorities predominate. 
Bibo makes some striking observations. He makes a helpful distinction between 
nationalism, uncritical loyalty to one's nation-state with its potential destructiveness, and 
patriotism, a loyal, positive but self critical affirmation of one's ethnic identity. He 
recommends seeing national boundaries as fluid and adjustable along ethnic and linguistic 
lines rather than in accord with historic claims. The international community needs to 
mediate ethnic conflict-although Bibo is certainly keenly aware of potential ethnic and 
national resentment at the slightest hint of interference in theit: internal affairs. 
Lest my presentation of Bibo's treatment of the potential resolution of ethnic and national 
conflict seems to paint him as unrealistically utopian, I need to point out that he was a 
pragmatist, realist, firmly rooted in history. His espousal of the principle of self-
determination is an extension of his consistent democratic orientation, political liberties 
safeguarded by liberal democracy, the prospects for the domination of the political process 
by the economically powerful precluded by the implementation of economic democracy. The 
implemention of political democracy, economic justice, and the self-determination of nations 
and communities in the most realistic sense, are necessary if humans are to be free of 
domination, and we can be free of domination only if we are free from fear, out of which 
emanates the need to dominate and the willingness to be dominated. The search for 
structures and institutions that foster democratic character free from fear, that embody 
democracy, economic justice, and self -determination needs to be continuous. 24 
I need to point out that the suffering of the Hungarian people led Bibo, like Ady before 
him, not to animosity toward other ethnic and national groups but to identify and be in 
solidarity with their sufferings and aspirations. Bibo's defense of the fundamental dignity 
of all human beings and the need to institutionalize it in political, economic and national and 
communal existence rests in a very fundamental way on his profoundly religious 
understanding of human existence. No less than Ady, Bibo continues to play the role of a 
prophet in the lives of his people.25 
III. 
In this essay, I have explored the lives and works of Endre Ady and Istvan Bibo, two 
significant figures in Hungarian history, as examples of Central and Eastern European 
cultural and religious resources for the potential resolution of ethnic and national conflict in 
the region, perhaps the greatest contribution it can make to the creation of world peace. 
They typify the notion of a "usable past" the reappropriation of which can help provide the 
ethos, the values and vision requisite and necessary for the possible resolution of national and 
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ethnic conflict. Hungarian patriots and nationalists of unique stature and prominence, out 
of the sufferings and aspirations of the Magyars, both of them identified and had the deepest 
sense of solidarity with the sufferings and aspirations of other ethnic and national groups. 
I also used them as two particular examples (I could have used any number of prominent 
historical figures of other nationalities; Vaclav Havel readily comes to mind) of the 
inseparability of religion and culture in Central and Eastern Europe; although prototypes of 
secular intellectuals, the lives and works of Ady and Bibo remain unintelligible apart from 
a consideration of their religious sensibilities. They both played prophetic roles in the history 
of the Hungarian people. 
How is this ethos, affirming the sufferings and aspirations of all of the people of Central 
and Eastern Europe, with their unique, particular yet interdependent histories, to be realized? 
I shall make proposals in the areas of religion and education, and allude briefly to politics 
and economics. 
If one of the traditional functions of religion is to unite, to bind peoples, cultures and 
civilizations together, faithful to the meaning of one of the Latin words from which the 
English word religion is derived, religo, to rebind, to bind together, then, in one sense, 
religion has been quite successful; it has bound together particular ethnic and national groups 
and communities. However, in another sense, it has also been quite divisive; religion and 
nationalism have been inseparably linked, uniting a particular nationality but cutting it off 
from and often demonizing others in the process. 
The connection between nationalism and religion often takes on messianic, mythic, 
proportions. In the words of Paul Mojzes: 
In Eastern Europe each national group feels itself to be a victim. 
Among Christian nations there is a frequent recourse to identifying 
oneself with the suffering of Christ. One often hears that no nation 
on earth suffered more that it did. 26 
Furthermore, he states: 
The Holy Virgin Mary, meek and mild, is often envisioned as the 
queen of the nation. All of that would suggest that each nation 
considers itself to be allied with the forces of goodness; hence their 
adversaries would logically appear to be allied with the Great 
Adversary, Satan. It would seem that the various national scripts are 
nearly identical. One needs only to fill in the blank of countries that 
inflicted the suffering.27 
Members of one's national group who attempted to reach a modus vivendi with the so-called 
enemy are usually depicted as traitors; the survival of the individual is subordinate to the 
survival of the nation; even national defeats are treated as sacred moments enabling a 
subjugated nation to survive.28 
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In spite of this traditionally close relationship to nationalism, religious communities can 
play an important peacemaking role among the ethnic groups and nationalities of Central and 
Eastern Europe. For one thing, although intimately attached to particular nationalities, all 
of the Christian churches in the region profess to bej catholic, to be universal; in their 
fragmentary ways, all of them are witness to the universal, unbounded love of God that 
stretches us beyond O\lr particularities even as. it affirms those particularities. A place for 
religious com'mul)itie~Jrto · b,egin mig~t very we~l.,be ;bY. 'fycog~izing that the unique 
particularity of one's ~~~up do~s:not preclude the affirmation of and appreciation for the 
unique particularities of other communities. One step in this endeavor would be to poi'nt to 
the near identity of national scripts the common themes of suffering and victimization often 
identified with the suffering of Christ. Needless to say, in order to do this, the churches 
have to adopt a prophetic stance (in the spirit of an Ady or a Bibo)--no small task in an era 
of resurgent nationalism, compounded by the ambiguity of the legacy of over forty years of 
suppression of religious communities. 
Education can also play a vital role in cultivating the kind of ethos necessary for the 
resolution of ethnic and national conflict. By education, I do not mean propaganda. Rather, 
I mean appreciative yet critical study not only of one's own national heritage but the heritage 
of other ethnic and national groups, affirming them, seeing commonalities as well as 
differences, freely admitting the shortcomings of one's own nation. 
Of course, by themselves, such measures in religion and education will not resolve the 
main source of ethnic and national conflict in the region--the simple fact that as each group 
tries to recreate its past greatness, there is quite simply not enough land as two or more 
groups consider the same territory their inviolable historic birthright.29 Quite obviously, 
there is no easy solution to this situation. A proposal such as that of Bibo for fluctuating 
borders based on the ethnic and linguistic make up of the population rather than historic 
claims is likely to meet with considerable r~sistance in the foreseeable future. However, the 
guarantee and protection of the rights of ethnic and national minorities, decentralization, and 
regional and local autonomy empowered by the previously discussed ethos cultivated in 
religion and education are indispensable for the potential resolution of ethnic, conflict and, 
concomitantly, for the creation of peace in the region. 
The idea of a Trans-Danubian Federation or Eastern Switzerland may seem anachronistic 
in an age when the nationalities involved in that proposal have had their own nation-states 
for over seventy years. Yet, by seeing and studying that notion as a creative response to the 
challenges of its day, Eastern and Central Europe may be empowered to respond creatively 
to the challenges it faces today. It seems highly unlikely that the nations of the region will 
be amenable to turning pacifist in the near future. However, regional disarmament could 
perhaps become a long range goal, serving the long term interests of all parties concerned. 
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In the interim, a permanent structure of negotiation for the non-violent resolution of conflict 
could be established perhaps following, hopefully more quickly and effectively, the pattern 
established by the U.N. negotiated cease fire between Serbia and Croatia. 
Finally, we would be remiss not to remember the degree to which economic deterioration 
has contributed historically to the inflammation of xenophobic passion. As the nations of 
Central and Eastern Europe make the unprecedented transition from command to market 
economies, they are at a critical juncture in their histories, with acute possibilities of shaping 
their futures creatively or destructively. The region has the opportunity to create new 
models of economic arrangements, perhaps combining the market with a heritage of social 
welfare long antedating Communism (the social welfare legislation enacted in the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, the legacy of the Masaryks and Benes in the former Czechoslovakia). 
The greatest challenge to Central and Eastern Europe is the creation of environmentally 
sustainable economies. There are instances of attitudes and policies toward projects that 
threaten the environment developing along national lines and exacerbating ethnic tensions 
(between Slovaks and Hungarians, for instance). There are important cultural and religious 
resources, such as the romantic tradition, the nature mysticism of popular religion, with 
particular variations, common to the region, the reappropriation of which could be heipful 
to the provision of the values and vision necessary for dealing adequately with the 
environmental crisis.30 In closing, to allude biblical images and symbols, the greatest 
contribution Central and Eastern Europe can make to creation of world peace is for the Serb 
and the Croat, the Magyar and the Romanian, the Magyar and the Slovak, the Pole and the 
Russian to learn to lie next to each other. Having long, distinctive histories of suffering and 
victimization, often at each other's hands, and identified with the sufferings of Christ, it is 
time for the ethnic groups and nationalities of the region together in their unique 
particularities, to participate in the resurrection to a newness life. 
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